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CASENOTES
indirectly on the promise, but on the fraudulent inducement, and therefore
the Statute of Frauds is no bar.' 0
Although Florida courts recognize that promises made without intention
to perform constitute fraud, 17 they are reluctant to apply this rule to
promises made within the Statute of Frauds, contending it would negate
the purpose of the statute.'
In the instant case, the court applied this
reasoning in dismissing the action as an indirect attempt to recover on
the contract. They will not allow void contracts to be admitted either
directly or indirectly for measure of damages. 19
In the writer's opinion, a refusal by courts to allow any recovery
in tort on a barred contract, under the premise that the Statue of Frauds
is designed to prevent fraud and should be strictly applied, will in many
cases actually shield fraud. Strict, "to the letter" application of the
statute in cases of proved fraud affords a good defense to the perpetrators.
Would any other construction of the statute cloud the distinction between
cotnract and tort remedies? Considering the injustice wrought by denying
any recovery, it would seem 'that clear thinking could dispel any possible
clouds on the distinction, and strict application of the statute could be
relaxed to the extent that it would fulfill its purpose, to prevent fraud, in
more cases.
Alan H. Dombrowsky

TORTS-FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT-INDEMNITY
Plaintiff brought an action against the United States for injuries
sustained when his automobile collided with a negligently driven government vehicle. The government, after suffering an adverse judgment under
the Federal Tort Claims Act, sought to recover, by way of indemnity,
the amount of the judgment from the employee involved in the collision.
Held, Section 2676 of the United States Code bars any legal basis for
16. Nanos v. Harrison, 97 Conn. 529, 117 Ati. 803 (1922); Texas Co. c. Sloan,
171 Kan. 182, 231 P.2d 255 (1951); Papanilolas v. Sampson, 73 Utah 404, 274 Pac.
856 (1929).
17. OMelia v. Adkins, 73 Cal. App.2d 143, 166 P.2d 298 (1946); Day v.

weadock, 101 Fla. 333, 134 So. 525 (1931); Feldman v. Witmark, 254 Mass, 480,

150 N.E. 329 (1926); Rutan v. Straehly, 289 Mich. 341, 286 N.W. 639 (1939);
Brittingham v. Huylers, 120 N.J. Eq. 198, 184 Atl. 529 (Ct. Err. & App. 1936);
Zora Realty Co. v. Green, 186 Misc. 1044, 60 N.Y.S.2d 440 (Sup. Ct. 1946); Harris
v. Sanderson, 178 S.W.2d 315 (Texas 1944); Kritzer v. Moffat, 136 Wash. 410, 240
Pac. 355(1925); Davis v. Alford, 113 W. Va. 30, 166 S.E. 701 (1932).
18. Yates v. Ball, 132 Fla. 132, 181 So. 341 (1938). But cf. McCorquodale
v. Keyton, 63 So.2d 906 (Fla. 1953)(easement for a park, designated on plat, held
satisfying the statute).
19. Van Camp v. Van Camp, 291 Mich. 668, 289 N.W. 297 (1939).
1. 28 U.S.C. § 2676 (Supp. 1948). "Ile judgment in an action . . . shall
constitute a complete bar to any action by the claimant . . . against the employee
whose act or omission gave rise to the claim."

MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
indemnity, precluding the government from recovery.

Gilman v. United

States, 206 F.2d 846 (9th Cir. 1953).
Indemnity stems from the common law principle that everyone is

responsible for his own torts-.2 It is universally recognized today that an
employer who is liable to a third person solely under the doctrine of
respondeat superior may be indemnified by his erring servant. This view
is based on the equitable principle that the person actually at fault should
bear the loss resulting from his wrong, and would be unjustly 4enriched
by the master's being compelled to satisfy the servant's obligation.
Prior to the passage of the Federal Tort Claims Act, the government
had no right of indemnity against a negligent employee because Congress
had never made provision for the assertion of such claims., Under the
common law principle of governmental immunity, a citizen negligently
injured by a governmental employee had no right of action in any court
unless lie obtained the government's consent to be sued.' 1is only other
possible relief was to appeal to Congress for private legislation. 7 Prayers
for private legislation became so numerous and burdensome, that the
Federal Tort Claims Act was passed to relieve the situation. 8 Therefore,
the primary purpose of this act was to make changes of procedure which
would enable Congress to devote more time to major public issues?
The act is silent on the question whether the government has a right
of indemnity against a negligent employee. Two cases have arisen which
dealt with this problem,' 0' and although the basic facts in both cases are
similar, the decisions are diametrically opposite. In Burks v. United
States, the court based its decision upon the conmmon law rule of indemnity
and held that the government does have such a right against a negligent
employee." The court reasoned that by statute the government is held
to the liability of a private employer, and therefore should enjoy one of
the concomitant rights which flow from such a liability.' 2 (Section 1346
(b) U.S. Code:' 3 ". . . under circumstances vhere, the United States,

if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the
place where the act or omission took place

....

").

This view is shared

2. PRossER, TORTS 1114 (1941 .
3. Hunter v. DeLuxe Drive-In Flheaters. 257 S.WV.2d 255 (Mo. 1953).
4. KFENER, QUASI CONTRACTS 408 (1893).

5. 40 OnS. Arr'y Gi.-- 38 (1941).
6. Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264 (U.S. 1821).
7. Gibbons v. United States, 8 Wall. 269 (U.S. 1868).
8. 92 CONG. REc. 10037-10104, 10139-10152, 10675 (1945).
9. United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 US. 543 (1951).
10. Gilman v. United States, 206 F.2d 846 (9th Cir. 1953); Burks v. United
States, 116 F. Supp. 337 (S.D. Tex. 1953).
11. 116 F. Supp. 337 (S.D. Tex. 1953).
12. Burks v. United States, 116 F. Supp. 3;7 (S.D. Tex. 1953).
13. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1946).

by eminent text authorities,1 4 and by the author of the Federal Tort
Claims Act.1 5
Opposed is the viewpoint which examines the purpose of the actmerely to eliminate the necessity for passage of private acts. 10 The Congress
did not intend to place the government in the exact position of a private
employer since there is no complete waiver of immunity." The act
requires some misfeasance or nonfeasance for its application. This view
takes into consideration the fact that the government had no right of
indemnity before the passage of the act, and therefore it is consistent to
say that after the passage of the act the government still had no right of
indemnity.' 8
The decision in the instant case concurred with the latter theory.
The court ruled that any legal basis for indemnity was lacking, since
there was no unjust enrichment present. The decision was based upon
the ground that the employee was not answerable to the original claimant
once the judgment was rendered against the government under Section
2672 of the United States Code.' 0
In this writer's opinion, the reasoning in the instant case is fallacious.
Section 2676 of the United States Code bars the original claimant from
subsequent proceedings against the negligent employee, but nowhere does
it say, or imply that the government is also barred from an action against
the negligent employee. The court seems to ignore the fact that the
liability of the government is not the claimant's exclusive remedy, since0
he has an election to sue either the negligent employee or the government.2
If he chooses to bring an action against the government, it should definitely
have the right of indemnity. To hold otherwise would be creating a
special society that is not responsible for its torts, and may very well lead
to collusion between the employee and claimant.
Hillard Chapnick

14. 3 MoORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 14.29 (1938).
15. 56 Yale L.J. 534, 560 (1947). The author of the Federal Tort Claims Act,
without citation of pertinent authority, rather boldly states: "The Government clearly
would have a valid claim against the employee."
16. United States v. Praylow, 208 F.2d 291 (4th Cir. 1953).

17. See Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 20 (1953).
18. See note 5 sura.
19. 28 U.S.C. § 2676 (Supp. 1948).
20. See note 12 supra.

